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Abstract
The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs
about ability become more precise (Holmstro¨m 1982/1999). In contrast, we show
that effort can increase with belief precision when agents compete for promotions to
better paid jobs that are assigned on the basis of perceived abilities. In this case, an
intermediate level of precision provides the strongest incentive for effort, with effort
increasing (decreasing) when beliefs are less (more) precise.
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1 Introduction
Economic agents exert effort not just for immediate rewards but also to build reputations
that yield future payoffs. This observation, first noted in Fama (1980), has given rise to a
sizable literature studying such implicit incentives due to career concerns. In the seminal
article of this literature, Holmstro¨m (1982/1999) showed that effort incentives decline as the
beliefs about an agent’s ability become more precise. Intuitively, additional performance
observations have less impact on an agent’s reputation when much is already known about
him, which means that the expected marginal return to effort is lower when beliefs are more
precise.1
We show that this key insight of the career concerns literature may no longer hold when
effort incentives are driven by a worker’s desire to build a reputation that improves his
promotion prospects. In our model, a worker is promoted to a better paid job if and only if
his posterior perceived ability exceeds a certain threshold; this threshold is ex ante uncertain
if several agents compete for a limited number of slots, but fixed in situations without slot
constraints. Such promotion rules are consistent with market-based promotion tournaments
building on Waldman’s (1984) theory of promotions as signals.2 In these models, promotions
are coupled with assignments to jobs with higher returns to ability, and the current employer
learns more about a worker’s ability than outside firms.3 The signal about ability associated
with a promotion thus raises potential employers’ willingness to pay for promoted workers,
which implies that promoted workers obtain a wage premium. In contrast, Holmstro¨m
(1982/1999) assumes that all workers perform the same task (with constant returns to ability)
and that all firms share the same information about workers, which implies that each worker’s
income is linearly increasing in the market’s belief about his ability.
1This result has been confirmed in many other papers, including Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999a,
1999b) and Casas-Arce (2009). A recent exception is Martinez (2009) who finds that the opposite may hold
in a multi-period career concerns model with job assignments in which the strength of incentives depends on
employment history and ability evolves over time in such a way that the precision of beliefs remains constant.
Greater precision can strengthen effort incentives in such a model due to the fact that next-period learning
has effects on current-period effort incentives. In contrast, we show that greater precision in beliefs can lead
to stronger effort incentives in a simple model of promotion contests with only one period of learning.
2See also Gibbs (1995), Bernhardt (1995), Zabojnik and Bernhardt (2001), Ghosh and Waldman (2010),
and Zabojnik (2012).
3Scho¨nberg (2007) and Kahn (2013) provide empirical evidence of such asymmetric learning between
firms.
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We find that the precision of beliefs about abilities has two effects on effort incentives.
First, it affects the probability that a worker’s posterior reputation is close to the threshold for
being promoted. Greater precision implies that the posterior reputation is likely to be close
to the prior reputation, which strengthens (dampens) effort incentives if the prior reputation
is close to (far from) the threshold. Second, it leads to the familiar “learning effect” already
mentioned. Greater precision means that the agent’s performance has less impact on the
posterior belief about his ability, which dampens effort incentives. Putting together these
two effects, we show that effort incentives are always maximized at an intermediate level
of belief precision, and increasing (decreasing) at all lower (higher) levels of precision. This
result holds both when two workers compete for a promotion awarded to the worker with the
better posterior reputation and when the reputation threshold for being promoted is fixed.
The result is also robust to adding a bias in favor of one of the workers.
The plan of this short paper is as follows. In Section 2, we set up and analyze a model
of promotion contests based on perceived abilities, and establish our main result that the
relation between effort incentives and the precision of beliefs about ability is non-monotonic.
Next, we discuss differences with respect to rank-order tournaments in which the principal
commits to promoting the agent with the better performance, even if the other agent has a
superior reputation. Section 3 offers a brief conclusion.
2 Belief Precision in Promotion Contests
2.1 A Model of Promotion Contests
Consider a one-period game between a principal and two agents j = 1, 2. The agents’
innate ability levels, η1 and η2, are unobservable to all parties. We assume that the prior
distribution of beliefs about ηj is normal with mean mj and precision (equal to the inverse
of the variance) hj. The prior distributions of η1 and η2 are independent. As in Holmstro¨m
(1982/1999), all parties share the same prior beliefs.
At the beginning of the period, the agents simultaneously decide how much effort to
exert. Agent j’s effort aj ∈ [0,∞) is unobservable to the principal and agent k 6= j. The
cost of effort is an increasing and strictly convex function c (aj) with c (0) = c
′ (0) = 0 and
2
limaj→∞ c
′ (aj) =∞. Agent j’s performance is
yj = ηj + aj + εj,
where εj is a stochastic noise term. We assume that ε1 and ε2 are independently and normally
distributed with zero means and precision hε.
The principal has one slot at a higher job level available. After observing y1 and y2, the
principal updates his beliefs and promotes agent j 6= k ∈ {1, 2} if and only if
E
[
ηj | yj
]
> E [ηk | yk] + ∆k. (1)
If ∆k = 0, the principal selects the agent with the highest perceived ability. If ∆k > (<)0, the
contest is biased in favor of (against) agent k. ∆k = 0 is a natural assumption in the context
of promotions to higher job levels. Suppose that after the principal selects a worker, there is
a second and final period in which the selected worker is assigned to a job level with a higher
return to ability (Rosen 1982; Waldman 1984; Ghosh and Waldman 2010). Promoting the
worker with the higher expected ability then maximizes the firm’s expected second-period
profits. Although biasing the contest can potentially improve effort incentives in the first
period, it would require the principal to commit to an ex post sub-optimal decision, an
unlikely scenario for promotions based on non-verifiable reputations.4
Agent j maximizes
Πj
(
aj; a
e
j , ak, a
e
k
)
= Pj
(
aj; a
e
j , ak, a
e
k
)
W − c (aj) ,
where the probability that j is promoted, Pj
(
aj; a
e
j , ak, a
e
k
)
, is a function of the agents’ actual
and anticipated (ae1 and a
e
2) effort levels, and W > 0 is the wage premium upon promotion.
5
The equilibrium concept is (pure-strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Denote by
4See O’Keefe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984), Lazear and Rosen (1981, Section IV), and Meyer (1991,
1992) for detailed discussions of the possible benefits of biases in rank-order tournaments where the principal
has commitment power. Other reasons why the principal may extend preferential treatment to some agents
(i.e., ∆k 6= 0) are discrimination, affirmative action, or nepotism.
5In a full-fledged model of market-based promotion tournaments, the size of the wage premium W would
be determined endogenously and could thus depend on h1 and h2. We discuss how this would affect our
results at the end of the analysis.
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(a∗1, a
∗
2) the equilibrium effort choices. In equilibrium, each agent’s effort must be optimal
given beliefs and the competing agent’s effort choice, and all parties must rationally anticipate
the equilibrium effort choices, i.e., aej = a
∗
j for j = 1, 2.
If aej = a
∗
j , j’s posterior reputation given yj is
E
[
ηj | yj
]
=
hjmj + hε
(
yj − a∗j
)
hj + hε
(2)
Define the random variable
ζj =
hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
+ ∆k −
hjmj + hε(ηj + εj)
hj + hε
.
Our independence and normality assumptions imply that the prior distribution of ζj is
normal with mean
mk + ∆k −mj
and variance
σ2 =
(
hε
h1 + hε
)2(
1
h1
+
1
hε
)
+
(
hε
h2 + hε
)2(
1
h2
+
1
hε
)
(3)
We denote this distribution by ϕj (·) with c.d.f. Φj (·). Note that ϕ1 (−z) = ϕ2 (z) for all
z ∈ R, and denote by ϕ (0) = ϕ1 (0) = ϕ2 (0) the prior density of E [η1 | y1]+∆1 = E [η2 | y2]
given that aj = a
∗
j for all j.
We now turn to j’s effort decision. Given ak = a
∗
k, j’s winning probability becomes
Pj(aj; a
∗
j , a
∗
k, a
∗
k) = Pr
{
hkmk + hε(ηk + εk)
hk + hε
+ ∆k <
hjmj + hε
(
ηj + aj + εj − a∗j
)
hj + hε
}
= Φj
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j)
)
.
The marginal impact of aj on j’s expected payoff given ak = a
∗
k is hence
∂Πj(aj; a
∗
j , a
∗
k, a
∗
k)
∂aj
= ϕj
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j)
)
hε
hj + hε
W − c′ (aj) ,
4
and the first-order conditions for a pure-strategy equilibrium become
c′
(
a∗j
)
= ϕ (0)
hε
hj + hε
W for each j = 1, 2. (4)
Our assumptions on c (·) imply that each first-order condition has a unique and strictly
positive solution.
However, Πj(aj; a
∗
j , a
∗
k, a
∗
k) can potentially reach its global maximum at a value aj > 0
different from a∗j defined in (4), in which case the game has no pure-strategy equilibrium.
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To rule out such cases, the ensuing analysis assumes that Πj is strictly concave in aj given
a∗j :
ϕ′j
(
hε
hj + hε
(aj − a∗j)
)(
hε
hj + hε
)2
W − c′′ (aj) < 0 for all aj ≥ 0. (5)
If mk + ∆k −mj ≤ − hεhj+hεa∗j , (5) always holds; otherwise, (5) holds if and only if
W < W j ≡
(
hj + hε
hε
)2
max
aj∈
(
0,a∗j+
hj+hε
hε
(mk+∆k−mj)
)
 c′′ (aj)
ϕ′j
(
hε
hj+hε
(aj − a∗j)
)
 , (6)
where a∗j is as defined in (4). Under the assumption that (5) holds for j = 1, 2, the game
has a pure-strategy equilibrium with the effort levels a∗1, a
∗
2 > 0 implied by (4).
2.2 Belief Precision and Effort Incentives
The career concerns literature predicts that greater precision in beliefs dampens effort in-
centives. We are interested in whether the same holds for promotion contests in which only
relative perceived abilities matter, as described above. From the first-order conditions in (4),
it is apparent that h1 < h2 implies a
∗
1 > a
∗
2: the agent whose ability is better known exerts
less effort. When beliefs about one or both agents’ abilities become more precise, however,
effort incentives can become stronger, as we show next. That is, consider two contests, A
and B, that are identical except that h1 is higher in contest B; in this case, the equilibrium
effort levels of both agents may be higher in contest B than in contest A.
We first state the formal results and then discuss the underlying effects. The proof of
6c′ (0) = 0 implies that ∂Πj∂aj |aj=0> 0, hence Πj never reaches a maximum at aj = 0.
5
Proposition 1 is relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Let j 6= k ∈ {1, 2}.
(i) For any (m1,m2, hk, hε,∆1), there exists a unique threshold h
self
j (m1,m2, hk, hε,∆1) > 0
such that
da∗j
dhj
> (<)0 if and only if hj < (>)h
self
j .
Moreover, limhj→0 a
∗
j = limhj→∞ a
∗
j = 0, and limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
=∞.
(ii) If
(m1 + ∆1 −m2)2 ≤
(
hε
hj + hε
)2(
1
hj
+
1
hε
)
, (7)
then
da∗j
dhk
> 0 for all hk.
Otherwise, for any (m1,m2, hj, hε,∆1), there exists a unique threshold h
comp
k (m1,m2, hj, hε,∆1) >
0 such that
da∗j
dhk
> (<)0 if and only if hk < (>)h
comp
k .
Moreover, limhk→0 a
∗
j = 0, limhk→∞ a
∗
j > 0, and limhk→0
da∗j
dhk
=∞.
The precisions of beliefs h1 and h2 affect the first-order conditions in (4) that determine
equilibrium effort levels through two channels. First, hj affects the rate
hε
hj+hε
at which a
marginal increase in yj improves j’s posterior reputation (see (2)). This is the standard
learning effect, which ceteris paribus predicts that greater precision in the beliefs about j’s
ability leads to lower effort by j.
Second, both h1 and h2 affect ϕ (0), the prior density of E [η1 | y1] + ∆1 = E [η2 | y2],
through their impact on the variance σ2 of ϕ1 and ϕ2 (see (3)). The first-order conditions
in (4) imply that both agents’ equilibrium effort levels are increasing in ϕ (0). Intuitively,
effort incentives are stronger if agents assign a higher probability to the race having a close
outcome. The impact of an increase in either h1 or h2 on ϕ (0) is ambiguous, however:
given our normality assumptions, a marginal increase in the precision of beliefs about either
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agent’s ability raises ϕ (0) if and only if
(m1 + ∆1 −m2)2 < σ2. (8)
Intuitively, greater precision in beliefs (about one’s own or the rival’s ability) strengthens
effort incentives if the agents’ starting positions are relatively symmetric, that is, if m1 + ∆1
is close to m2. If starting conditions are sufficiently asymmetric, however, then greater
precision dampens effort incentives because it lowers the probability that the underdog can
beat the frontrunner.
This second “closeness effect” explains why hk has an impact on j’s equilibrium effort.
Although learning about j’s ability is independent of the beliefs about k’s ability, hk affects
the probability that the contest outcome will be close, which, in turn, affects j’s effort
incentives. More specifically,
da∗j
dhk
> 0 if and only if (8) holds. The variance σ2 is strictly
decreasing in hk with limhk→0 σ = ∞. Two cases can occur: either (m1 + ∆1 −m2)2 >
limhk→∞ σ
2, in which case there exists a unique hcompk such that (8) holds if and only if
hk < h
comp
k , or (m1 + ∆1 −m2)2 < limhk→∞ σ2, in which case (8) holds for all hk. The latter
inequality coincides with condition (7) in part (ii) of the proposition.7
The results in part (i) of the proposition stem from the combination of the learning effect
and the closeness effect. Since ϕ (0) is symmetric in h1 and h2, the closeness effect is again
positive if and only if (8) holds; the learning effect is always negative.8 If hj is high enough,
then the negative learning effect always dominates: as the rate of belief updating about j’s
ability converges to zero, j’s effort incentives completely vanish. When there is sufficient
uncertainty about j’s ability (hj close to zero), on the other hand, the closeness effect is
positive and dominates the negative learning effect. This is because the closeness effect goes
to infinity as hj approaches zero, while the learning effect remains finite. Figure 1 illustrates
Proposition 1(i) in an example.9
7The comparative statics results with respect to hε are qualitatively similar. If m1 + ∆1 = m2, then
daj
dhε
> 0 for all hε. If (m1 + ∆1 −m2)2 > limhε→∞ σ2 = 0, then there exists a threshold ĥε > 0 such that
daj
dhε
R 0 if and only if hε S ĥε. See also Kwon (2013).
8Note that the symmetry of ϕ(0) in h1 and h2 and the fact that the learning effect is always negative
imply that
da∗j
dhj
<
da∗j
dhk
whenever h1 = h2 and that h
self
j (m1,m2, h, hε,∆1) < h
comp
k (m1,m2, h, hε,∆1) for any
h (in cases where hcompk is defined).
9In the example depicted in Figure 1, strict concavity of the payoff functions implies the following upper
7
2 4 6 8 10
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
h1
a∗1
Figure 1: Agent 1’s equilibrium effort if c (a) = a
2
2 , m1 + ∆1 −m2 = 0, h2 = 2, hε = 1, W = 5.
Comparative statics results with respect to the other model parameters are as expected.
First,
da∗j
dW
> 0: the higher the wage premium, the stronger are effort incentives. Second,
a∗j is increasing in mj as long as mj < mk + ∆k but decreasing in mj for mj > mk + ∆k.
Intuitively, the marginal return to effort is higher in a more symmetric race, i.e., for mj
closer to mk + ∆k. Similarly, a
∗
j is increasing in mk + ∆k if and only if mj > mk + ∆k.
In the model discussed so far, relative reputations determine which agent obtains a wage
premium. The resulting reward-to-reputation function is both non-linear (the agent obtains
a wage premium if and only if his posterior reputation exceeds that of his rival) and ex ante
uncertain (the threshold depends on the realization of the rival agent’s performance). It
is easy to see that the non-linearity in payoffs drives the result that belief precision has a
non-monotonic effect on effort.10 Suppose that j is promoted if and only if
E
[
ηj | yj
]
> η, (9)
bounds on W :
W 1 =
(1 + h1)
(
6 + h1 + h
2
1
)√
epi
2
3h1
,W 2 =
3
(
6 + h1 + h
2
1
)√
epi
2
h1 (1 + h1)
,
with minh1 W 1 ' 10.91 and minh1 W 2 ' 6.20. Hence, for W = 5, the game has a pure strategy equilibrium
for all levels of h1.
10See also Bar-Issac and Deb (2014) who, in independent work, allow for a general (deterministic) returns-
to-reputation function in the original Holmstro¨m (1982/1999) model and show that effort incentives can be
non-monotonic in the precision of beliefs.
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where η is a fixed threshold. In Ghosh and Waldman (2010), for instance, firms have two
different jobs and choose η such that assigning an agent to the job in which ability matters
more (less) is optimal for the firm when E [ηi | yi] > (<)η. This promotion rule corresponds
to situations in which there are no constraints on the number of promotions the firm can
grant. Keeping all other assumptions unchanged, a model in which promotions are based on
the rule in (9) is the limit case of our contest model for hk →∞ and mk + ∆k = η (k 6= j).
Since j’s equilibrium effort a∗j in the contest is continuous in hk, the non-monotonicity result
from Proposition 1(i) continues to hold:11
Corollary 1 Suppose 1 receives W > 0 if and only if E [η1 | y1] > η. For any values of
m1, hε, and η, there exists a threshold h˜1 > 0 such that 1’s equilibrium effort a
∗∗
1 is strictly
increasing (decreasing) in h1 if and only if h1 < (>)h˜.
As noted, the wage premia associated with promotions would need to be endogenous in a
full-fledged model of market-based promotion tournaments (with or without slot constraints).
While a full analysis of such a model is beyond the scope of this paper, a few comments on
how this would affect our main result are in order. Any impact of hj on Wj (agent j’s wage
premium from promotion) would introduce an additional effect of hj on a
∗
j . More specifically,
if an increase in hj leads to an increase (decrease) in Wj, then
da∗j
dhj
will be higher (lower) than
in our model with fixed W . However, the qualitative finding that a∗j is first increasing and
then decreasing in hj remains unchanged as long as the impact of hj on Wj remains finite.
2.3 Discussion: Reputation- versus Performance-Based Promo-
tions
Although most promotion decisions are based on assessments of ability, promotion contests
are often modeled as rank-order tournaments a` la Lazear and Rosen (1981) in which the
11One may wonder whether the uncertainty inherent in the rivalry between multiple agents weakens or
strengthens j’s effort incentive for a given expected threshold, i.e., assuming mk+4k = η. The answer follows
from the earlier analysis on the impact of uncertainty about the rival’s ability summarized in Proposition
1(ii). If
(
mj − η
)2 ≤ ( hεhj+hε)2 ( 1hj + 1hε), then da∗1dh2 > 0, which implies that a∗∗1 = limh2→∞ a∗1 > a∗1. In
this case a reduction of uncertainty increases j’s effort incentive by raising the likelihood that the outcome
will be close. If
(
m1 − η
)2
>
(
hε
h1+hε
)2 (
1
h1
+ 1hε
)
, Proposition 1(ii) implies that there exists a threshold
ĥ2 ∈ (0, hcomp2 ) such that a∗∗1 < a∗1 if and only if h2 > ĥ2.
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principal commits to promote the agent with the better performance, even if another agent
has a higher perceived ability.12 Since the promotion decision is independent of the principal’s
beliefs about abilities, the previously discussed learning effect plays no role in a performance-
based tournament. The precision of beliefs still affects effort incentives through the closeness
effect, however, provided agents are uncertain about their abilities.
The effects of increases in h1 or h2 on effort incentives in rank-order tournaments are
similar to those of a decrease in noise due to a higher hε, as analyzed by Hvide (2002) and
Kra¨kel and Sliwka (2004) in tournaments with known abilities. If prior winning chances are
sufficiently symmetric (asymmetric), greater precision increases (decreases) effort incentives.
More formally, if the principal promotes agent j if and only if
yj > yk + ∆k,
then it is easy to show that equilibrium effort levels in our setting are increasing in both h1
and h2 if and only if
13
(m1 + ∆1 −m2)2 < 1
h1
+
1
h2
+
2
hε
, (10)
which is the counterpart to condition (8) in the reputation-based promotion contest. Turning
to the impact of hj on j’s equilibrium effort, denoted by a
∗T
j , this insight implies the following
comparative statics results:
(i) If (∆1 +m1 −m2)2 ≤ 1hk + 2hε , then
da∗Tj
dhj
> 0 for all hj.
(ii) Otherwise, for any (m1,m2, hk,∆k) there exists a threshold h
T > 0 such that
da∗Tj
dhj
> (<)0
if and only if hj < (>)h
T .14
12Under perfect symmetry, a tournament leads to the same decision as a contest based on perceived
abilities: if m1 = m2 and h1 = h2, then E
[
ηj | yj
]
> E [ηk | yk] if and only if yj > yk. However, when
agents prior reputations differ due to disparities in their past achievements, the employee with the highest
posterior perceived ability need not be the one with the best recent performance. Adding a fixed bias to the
decision rule does not restore equivalence, as the principal updates his beliefs about different agents’ abilities
at differing rates in a contest based on perceived abilities.
13The following discussion assumes that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists, which always holds provided
hε is not too large; see Lazear and Rosen (1981, p. 845, fn. 2).
14The qualitative relation between a∗Tj and hj is similar in a model of performance-based promotions
without slot constraints where j is promoted if and only if yj > y. In that case, a
∗T
j is increasing in hj if
and only if (y −mj)2 < 1hj + 1hε , which implies that either a∗Tj is increasing in hj for all hj (if mj is close
enough to y), or the relation between a∗Tj and hj is as described in (ii).
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Comparing reputation- versus performance-based contests, the following key difference
appears. In a reputation-based contest, the relation between j’s equilibrium effort and hj
is always non-monotonic. For low hj, j’s effort is increasing in hj because of the closeness
effect; for high hj, j’s effort is decreasing in hj because of the learning effect, even if the
closeness effect is positive. In a performance-based contest, on the other hand, the absence of
the learning effect implies that for sufficiently symmetric winning chances, j’s effort is always
increasing in hj. The relation is non-monotonic only if prior winning chances are sufficiently
asymmetric, so that the closeness effect becomes negative at high levels of precision.
3 Conclusion
One of the insights from the career concerns literature that has become a received wisdom
among economists is that having better information about a worker’s ability dampens the
worker’s implicit effort incentives. Our paper sheds new light on the relation between pre-
cision of beliefs and effort incentives. Counter to the received wisdom, we show that when
agents exert effort in order to build a reputation for high ability that improves their future
promotion prospects, greater precision in beliefs can strengthen effort incentives.
Since employment relationships foster learning about ability (both for the employer and
the employee), our analysis predicts a non-monotonic relation between tenure and implicit
effort incentives due to future promotion prospects.15 A testable implication of this is that,
holding time to retirement constant, explicit incentives should be non-monotonic in tenure.16
More specifically, if implicit and explicit incentives are substitutes, then explicit incentives
are weakest for employees with intermediate tenure.17 Our analysis thus suggests that future
empirical research should explore the possibility of a non-monotonic relation between tenure
15To be more precise, this should hold as long as knowledge about the abilities of newly hired workers is
bad enough and knowledge about workers with long enough tenure is good enough so that both the increasing
and the decreasing sections of the relation are covered.
16In contrast, Gibbons and Murphy (1992), whose model features symmetric learning between firms as in
Holmstro¨m (1982/1999), predict that explicit incentives are increasing in tenure.
17Most theories that combine explicit and implicit incentives predict that the two are substitutes, e.g.,
Gibbons and Murphy (1992). However, Dewatripont at al. (1997) show that implicit and explicit incentives
can be complements, in which case our analysis would predict that explicit incentives are strongest for
employees with intermediate tenure. In either case, our theory predicts a non-monotonic relation, which
contrasts with existing work.
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and explicit effort incentives.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Making use of the normality of ϕj (·), the first-order condition
defining a∗j can be rewritten as
1√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
exp
(
−(mk + ∆k −mj)
2
2σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
hε
hj + hε
Wj = c
′ (a∗j) . (11)
Applying the implicit function theorem to (11) and rearranging terms yields
da∗j
dhj
=
exp
(
− (mk+∆k−mj)2
2σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)
√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
Wj
hε
hj+hε
c′′
(
a∗j
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
×
− ∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)∂hj
σ (hj, hk, hε)
(
1− (mk + ∆k −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
− 1
hj + hε
 .
(12)
We proceed by examining the limit values of
da∗j
dhj
. First, since limhj→∞
∂Pj(aj ;a∗j ,a∗k,a∗k)
∂aj
= 0,
lim
hj→∞
da∗j
dhj
= 0.
Second, we show that limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
= ∞. Using limhj→0 σ = ∞, the limit of (12) can be
simplified as follows:
lim
hj→0
da∗j
dhj
=
Wj√
2pic′′
(
a∗j
) lim
hj→0
− ∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)∂hj
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
 . (13)
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Using the expression for σ2 in (3) and further simplifying leads to
lim
hj→0
− ∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)∂hj
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
 = lim
hj→0
hε(2hj+hε)
2h2j (hj+hε)
2(
hε[hj(hj+hε)+hk(hk+hε)]
hjhk(hj+hε)(hk+hε)
) 3
2
= lim
hj→0
1
2
(
hε
hj(hj+hε)
)2
(
hε
hj(hj+hε)
) 3
2
= lim
hj→0
1
2
(
hε
hj (hj + hε)
) 1
2
=∞. (14)
Since c′′ > 0, (13) and (14) together imply that limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
=∞.
Next we show that there is a unique hselfj such that
da∗j
dhj
> 0 if and only if hj < h
self
j . Since
c′′ > 0,
da∗j
dhj
has the sign of the sum between square brackets in (12). Using the expression
for σ in (3) and simplifying, we find that
−
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hj
σ (hj, hk, hε)
(
1− (mk + ∆k −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
− 1
hj + hε
=
hk (2hj + hε) (hk + hε)
(
1− (mk+∆k−mj)2
σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)
− 2hj [hj (hj + hε) + hk (hk + hε)]
2hj (hj + hε) [hj (hj + hε) + hk (hk + hε)]
. (15)
da∗j
dhj
has the same sign as the numerator in (15). The partial derivative of the numerator in
(15) with respect to hj is
− 2hk (hk + hε) (mk + ∆k −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
+ hk (2hj + hε) (hk + hε)
(mk + ∆k −mj)2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
∂σ2
∂hj︸︷︷︸
<0
− 2 [hj (hj + hε) + hk (hk + hε)]− 2hj (2hj + hε) ,
which is negative. Together with the limit values limhj→0
da∗j
dhj
=∞ and limhj→∞
da∗j
dhj
= 0, this
implies that there exists a unique hselfj > 0 such that
da∗j
dhj
R 0 if and only if hj S hselfj .
The limit values limhj→0 a
∗
j and limhj→∞ a
∗
j are implied by the first-order condition in
(11). First, since limhj→0 σ = ∞, the left-hand-side of (11) goes to 0 for hj → 0. Thus,
limhj→0 a
∗
j = 0. Second, since limhj→∞ σ is finite but limhj→∞
hε
hj+hε
= 0, the left-hand-side
of (11) also goes to 0 for hj →∞. Hence, limhj→∞ a∗j = 0. This completes the proof of part
13
(i) of Proposition 1.
To prove part (ii), we apply the implicit function theorem to (11) to obtain
da∗j
dhk
=
exp
(
− (mk+∆k−mj)2
2σ2(hj ,hk,hε)
)
√
2piσ (hj, hk, hε)
Wj
hε
hj+hε
c′′
(
a∗j
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
−
∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hk
σ (hj, hk, hε)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(
1− (mk + ∆k −mj)
2
σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
. (16)
From (16) it is easy to see that
da∗j
dhk
> 0 if and only if (mk + ∆k −mj)2 < σ2. Since
limhk→0 σ
2 = ∞ and σ2 is strictly decreasing in hk (see (3)), this implies that da
∗
j
dhk
> 0 for
all hk if and only if (mk + ∆k −mj)2 ≤ limhk→∞ σ2 =
(
hε
hj+hε
)2 (
1
hj
+ 1
hε
)
. Otherwise, there
exists an hcompk > 0 such that
da∗j
dhk
R 0 if and only if hk S hcompk .
Since σ is symmetric in hj and hk, (14) implies that also limhk→0
(
−∂σ(hj ,hk,hε)
∂hk
/σ2 (hj, hk, hε)
)
=
∞. (16) therefore implies that limhk→0
da∗j
dhk
=∞. Finally, since limhk→0 σ =∞, (11) implies
that limhk→0 a
∗
j = 0, and since limhj→∞ σ is finite, (11) implies that limhk→∞ a
∗
j > 0 and
finite. This completes the proof of part (ii) of Proposition 1.
QED
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